

## 績效制度設計的資訊問題：訊號、機制設計與代理成本\*

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### 摘要

績效管理是公共行政學界長久以來關注的焦點之一，然而，學界雖然熱衷於「控制」機制的設計與執行，但卻未將制度設計最重要的元素：「資訊」(information)列為考量核心，因此，績效管理的研究當中，充滿了所謂的「行政諺語」。

近來理性選擇制度論(rational choice institutionalism)的蓬勃發展，提供公共行政學界一條從「資訊」角度重新思考績效管理基礎理論的機會。本文從績效管理制度環境的討論開始，了解到績效制度設計，必須面對資訊不對稱、策略互動及缺乏價格系統的問題。接著藉由討論績效制度設計中三項資訊的議題，使我們從中學習到績效制度的三個基礎設計。

其一，在資訊不對稱環境中「分辨」的機制：公部門績效制度有處理資訊分化與不對稱問題的需要，其中尤以設計「分辨」機制最為重要；其二，在策略互動環境中的「誘因相容」機制：公部門績效制度有處理誘因相容問題的需要，其中又以績效制度能夠「自我執行」(self-enforcing)最為重要；其三，在價格系統不存在環境中「內化」代理成本的機制：績效制度設計必須注意資訊成本及其「內生性」(endogeneity)的問題，其中以處理績效制度設計本身資源排擠的問題為最重要。

最後，本文對於當代公共行政學界的績效管理風潮提出呼籲，學界發展績效管理各類「行政諺語」的同時，應該回到理論的原點，探討背後的誘因與機制設計問題，如此才能創造出新一代、更貼近績效制度設計者需求的績效管理制度。

關鍵字：績效管理、制度設計、訊號、機制設計、代理成本

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*The Problem of Information in Designing Performance Review Institutions:  
Signaling, Mechanism Design, and Agency Costs*

Don-yun Chen<sup>+</sup>

Abstract

Performance management has long been a research focus in the field of public administration for years. However, according to the view from Herbert A. Simon, this sub-field is filled with “administrative proverbs” where different recommendations to improve performance management usually conflict with each other. In this article, author tries to refocus the above issue toward theory-building in performance management. Based on rational choice institutionalism and concentrated on the problem of “information,” the main arguments are as follows.

First, any performance management institution is operated under the environment where performance information is asymmetrically distributed, management intervention will induce strategic reactions, and a clear price system is not existed in public arena. Second, according to some newly developed theories in the field of game theory, mechanism design, and agency theory, this article concludes with three main recommendations on designing performance management institutions. A performance management institution must have (1) a “separating” mechanism to discrete subjects under an environment which performance information is asymmetrically distributed; (2) an “incentive-compatible” mechanism to induce subjects to follow the system without top-down authority in checking position all the time; (3) an “endogenized” mechanism to take into account the agency costs of the institution itself.

Lastly, according to arguments above, author proposes three vital principles for scholars in the field of public administration to redesign viable and effective performance management institutions in the future.

Keywords: Performance Management, Institutional Design, Signaling, Mechanism Design, Agency Costs

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