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Public Value Production in Cross-Sector Collaborations: Evidence from Problem Solving Cases in Taiwan

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Abstract

Public value is an emerging concept that attracts increasingly more attention in the field of public management for the past two decades. Further empirical examinations are needed to clarify its application whereas in Taiwan there is relatively fewer researches focusing on the analysis of pubic value. This paper uses a pragmatic problem solving approach with ten empirical cases from Taiwan to investigate how public value is created throughout cross-sector collaboration policy process. Two stages of the policy process are investigated: (1) the problem/solution nomination stage and (2) the solution implementation stage. A structuration approach is then applied to analyze the system of interaction between agents and the structure in which they are embedded.

Four findings are generated from this study: First, the study shows the importance of the solution implementation stage in widening the scope of public value and reproduction of value in an ongoing manner. Second, this public value pragmatist approach encourages a redefinition of the role of the public sector as societal entrepreneur, sponsors or champions with a leading “collaborative mind-set”. Third, positive “interdependence” between sectors is found to be as the most pivotal driver among others for successful collaboration initiative. Fourth, case analyses demonstrate the adaptation or resilient potential of cross-sector partnership.

Key Words: public value pragmatism, structuration theory, cross-sector collaboration, public-private partnership, problem solving

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I. Introduction

The best ways to value the use of public authority and public sector expenditures are pivotal theoretical and practical questions, particularly when the cost of public investment does not seem to produce an equal amount of public capital (Pritchett, 1996) and "the invisible hand of government" is mostly invisible in terms of economic growth (Block and Keller, 2011). One method to evaluate the output of government is to measure the public value of its production (Cole and Parston, 2006; Benington and Moore, 2011). Whereas the term "public value" was first coined by US academic Mark Moore in his seminal text written in 1995, his argument focuses on how to lay out a structure of practical reasoning to guide public managers of public enterprises to exploit the potential of their political and organizational settings for creating public value (Moore, 1995). The broader definition of public value refers to a correlate of private value, which is measured by shareholder return. Assuming citizens as shareholders in how their tax is spent, the public value may be created through economic prosperity, social cohesion or cultural development (Horner and Hazel, 2005). In other words, providing services is no longer a sufficient justification for state intervention funded by citizens. The question to be answered in "public value management" is "does the service advance valued social or economic outcomes" and "does it deliver public value" (Stoker, 2006: 47).

With growing interest in public value governance, it has led the field to move beyond public administration and New Public Management (NPM) (Bryson et al., 2014). By revisiting normative public value criteria, Bozeman (2002), later together with Johnson (Bozeman and Johnson, 2015), demonstrates the use of "public value failure" as criteria to evaluate quality of

public value, such as progressive opportunity, legitimate monopolies or distribution of benefits. Meanwhile, a growing number of scholars have applied these criteria in their researches in science and technology policy (Valdivia, 2011) or environmental policy (Meyer, 2011). Moreover, in the post-NPM world, scholars such as Alford and Hughes (2008) have called for the next movement in public management, referred to as "public value pragmatism," to introduce an approach in which the organization should be open to the utilization of any of a variety of means to achieve program purposes based on different circumstances and situational factors, including the value being produced or the nature of the task. This approach is principled about the ends — such as public value — but pragmatic about the means.

This research is initiated as a response to the above call for pragmatism approach in understanding public value creation. It is also one of the few extant studies in Taiwan to explore production of public value as policy output. By examining empirical cases of what type of "means" the public sector uses to solve social problems with an intended public value as an end — hereafter called the "problem solving approach" in this paper. One of the means government uses to solve social problems is to collaboratively offer public service with non-governmental partners as described in collaborative governance (Bryson et al., 2015; Ansell and Gash, 2008) literature, or the so-called public-private partnership (Osborne, 2000). This paper argues that designing and implementing problem solving differently during distinct stages of the policy process with various cross-sector partnerships can help unravel the blackbox of value production in government-supported activity (Kelly et al., 2002; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; Pinnock, 2006; Page et al., 2015), redefine the role of public agencies (Smith, 2004; O'Flynn, 2005; Stoker, 2006) and help public managers diagnose the circumstances in which they find themselves and what they should do (Moore, 1994, 2013).

Using ten cross-sector collaboration cases, two stages of the policy process are investigated in this paper: (1) the problem / solution nomination

stage and (2) the solution implementation stage. Interviews were initially conducted with senior civil servants in ten public agencies in Taiwan in 2013 to understand the thoughts and actions of public managers and the results of addressing a particular social problem collaboratively with non-governmental partners. Interviewees from each public agency were asked to recall a social problem that they encountered, its problem and solution nomination steps, its solution implementation procedure with partners, and the public value they perceived to be planned and created during the problem solving process. Ten site visits were then scheduled to assess the actual solution implementation process and supplemented by interviews with public service non-governmental providers. This paper contributes to the understanding of the value production process by grounding its findings in empirical cases based on the experience of senior civil servants and their cross-sector collaborators in a non-United States (US) setting. In an effort to make sense of and analyze the empirical findings through a theoretical lens, the analysis of the empirical cases borrows concepts from Giddens' (1979, 1984) structuration theory, in which agents are regarded as active participants embedded in a socio-structural context. Unlike structuralism, structuration sees the reproduction of a social system not as a mechanical outcome but as an active constituting process, accomplished by and consisting of the work of active subjects (Giddens, 1993). In applying structuration theory to the study of public value, a duality of structure is revealed in which the interactions between different agents — value producers, co-producers and reproducers — and the structure they are embedded in generates public value in an ongoing process. In this duality of structure, public value is no longer viewed as a fixed value but rather a dynamic value that is in a constant production, co-production, and reproduction cycle. Beyond structuration theory, this study also uses concepts and variables discussed in cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson et al., 2012) to systematically analyze the ten public-private collaboration cases. Such efforts aim at generating insights to advance our understanding in not only role of public value as one of outcomes in cross-sector collaborative but also what

drives collaborative initiatives and how can a collaboration be successful or sustainable.

In sum, this study examines empirically how public-private collaboration is one of the diverse means public sector can utilize to create additional public value that is otherwise not possible when the government acting along due to the lack of external co-producer or reproducer involvement in the public value production cycle. The contribution of this paper is fourfold: to emphasize solution implementation stage as value expansion venue; to redefine the role of the public sector; to explore drivers of collaboration; and to demonstrate the adaptation or resilient potential of cross-sector partnership. First, from the perspective of value production in policy process and cross-sector collaboration stages, the Taiwan case empirical analysis shows the importance of the solution implementation stage in widening the scope of value and reproduction of value in an ongoing manner with engagement of actors outside the government such as non-governmental organization or citizen. The implication of "implementation as evolution" in terms of organizational learning while emphasizing the value of cross-sector partnership in a democracy relies more on process than outcome. Second, the study encourages a redefinition of the role of the public sector. In demonstrating a multi-actor dynamic value production cycle, this study finds that the role of the public sector is less that of a public service provider or sole value producer than as a societal entrepreneur sponsors or champion with a "collaborative mind-set" discerning alternative solutions to complex social problems. Third, the ten cases inform us the most pivotal role of interdependence between various sectors as driver to initiate successful collaboration. Lastly, the empirical analyses allow us to appreciate not only deliberate planning but also emergent planning and how the unintended solutions to problems can be possible under "soft-wired" collaborative governance structure (Emerson et al., 2012: 19) with collaborating partners who are resilient enough to regroup and reframe problems at stake collectively (Crosby and Bryson, 2005).

II. A Pragmatic View of Value Production

Moore's (1995) original formulation of public value begins with a normative call for public managers to improve public service, thereby perceiving public value as a measurable benefit that can be intentionally created through careful planning. However, policy process involves an extremely complex set of interactive elements over time (Sabatier and Weible, 2014) and different stages such as agenda setting or problem identification (Kingdon, 1984; Nelson, 1984; Peters, 2005) and solution implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Goggin et al., 1990; Winter, 1990). How value is produced in these different stages of the policy process is scarcely investigated in the existing literature and can be characterized as a blackbox.

Moving forward from Moore, a value chain analysis connects public value to organizational structure and delivery (Bovaird, 2007). Benington (2011) further advocates networked community governance, in which the importance of co-production in the public sphere is emphasized and partner agencies contribute to the delivery of public value outcomes. A new public management approach is promoted to replace the old public-sector reform model that ignores both civil society (Smith, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Benington, 2011) and the role of the citizens as users and producers (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 2000; Alford, 2002, 2013; Kooiman, 2003; Thomas, 2012; Verschuere et al., 2012). Elsewhere, this multi-sector model of a value production cycle parallels the growing interest in the concept of "societal entrepreneurship" (Berglund et al., 2012), which includes not only social entrepreneurs (Austin et al., 2006; Zahra et al., 2009) — a term capturing the attention of students in management school and practitioners in the business

world — but also any actor, including public sector, who is contributing to the solution of social problems and the consequential value change movement.

Yet in spite of the popularity of this new public sector reform approach, when scholars engage in evaluating the public value in a cross-sector context, as in a public-private partnership relationship, the argument is dichotomously simplified: public value is either created or lost. In the "public value created" camp, some have theorized and presented empirical evidence to support the observation that accountability (Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Barberis, 1998; Salamon, 2002) and transparency (Osborne and Plastrik, 1998) may actually be stronger in cross-sector collaboration. In terms of their impact on political value, McQuaid (2000: 21) argued that partnerships may enhance the role of citizens in public policy decision-making because consumer-like behavior enables citizens to directly respond to the market of public service delivery. In the "public value lost" camp, scholars show the hindering effect of the public-private partnership on value creation in areas related to democratic deficit (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002), such as accountability (Collins and Butler, 2003; Frederickson and Smith, 2003), transparency (Hodge, 2004; Bloomfield, 2006; Flinders, 2010), and citizen participation (Box et al., 2001).

Moreover, even with increasing scholarly efforts, some have observed a relatively small number of empirical investigations associated with the normative propositions of public value and have striven to critique, clarify, and present debates (Talbot, 2009; Benington and Moore, 2011; Williams and Shearer, 2011). In particular, Alford and Hughes (2008) urged scholars to move beyond *one-best-way* orientations such as network governances or public-private partnerships. They called for "public value pragmatism" as the next phase of public management. Later Alford and Yates (2014: 346) introduced public value process map (PVPM) to help policy designers or administrators to break out of process-focused or intra-organizational assumptions and routines to think more broadly about both ends and means. Although such an approach retains the principles of public value as ends, as

outlined by Moore, it encourages scholars and public managers to explore multiple means, either from the public sector acting unilaterally or through public-private cooperation (Linder and Rosenau, 2000; Bovaird, 2007; Cohen and Eimicke, 2008; Skelcher, 2010) to improve public service delivery and achieve program purposes for different circumstances. They also noted that it is not who *produces* public value that makes value public but who *consumes* it.

Another interesting contribution of the "public value pragmatism" approach of Alford and Hughes is rooted in their understanding of public value creation via a problem solving orientation. Although they urged public managers to explore multiple managerial tools and suggested a series of "design rules" to solve social problems based on contingency theory (Chandler, 1962), they also proposed different levels to which a solution can apply such as the program, organization, and public-sector levels. The heterogeneity and contingency within each program, both across organizations and between citizens and the public sector, can pose challenges to notions of strategizing in public value creation. In other words, even though the public manager is still encouraged and expected to strategize to create public value as an end in designing government programs, it might be difficult for public managers to be solely responsible and accountable for outcomes and resources that are beyond their authority and reach in a networked governance era where public services are not always unilaterally delivered by the public sector.

III. Methodology

The purpose of this research is to unravel the blackbox of value production from a perspective of how value is produced in different stages of policy processes under the setting of cross-sector collaboration.

Extending from pragmatist view of public value, this research proposes to

examine public value from a problem solving perspective with an emphasis on the daily efforts of senior civil servants to alter social conditions and their collaborative solution implementation with cross-sector partners. It begins by examining empirical problem solving cases in public agencies. Ten social welfare public agencies in Taiwan were selected as interview sites based on accessibility, as not all public agencies were willing to accept the interview request from this study, and the social welfare sector is one area in Taiwan where the government works more collaboratively with non-governmental actors. Interviews were scheduled primarily with senior civil servants who were equipped with vast experience in organizational operations and full knowledge of the origin and implementation of any given case. Thus, these senior civil servants were capable of looking *outward* from the agency they managed, *upward* to the higher management team or governing environment, and *downward* to the public service end users (Figure 1[1]).



Figure 1 Operational scope of senior civil servant

Source: compiled by author.

Unlike political appointees or elected officials, most senior civil servants accumulate one or two decades of first-hand experience in a single public agency and are intimately familiar with how public policies in their domain are made and how problems are routinely solved in daily operation. Their abundant inside information and direct interaction with partners outside the

[1] A modified figure from Benington and Moore (2011: 29).

government makes them ideal candidates to provide observations that help to generate hypotheses for this cross-sector collaborative problem solving oriented research.

Representatives of each selected public agency were asked to describe a recent problem solving experience that involved the input and joint effort of non-governmental actors. At least two senior civil servants from each agency attended each interview session to ensure the accuracy of the data and to cross-check their information when necessary. The interview questions were semi-structured, including questions such as why the problem being described was a problem for the agency in question, who initially identified the problem, what solution was proposed by the agency, what the implementation process was, and what public value was intended and created in the cognitive perception of senior civil servants rather than the actual value generated. Then, ten site visits were arranged along with more interviews with the associated public service non-governmental providers to make sense of operational details both in the problem nomination and solution implementation stages and the actual public value created. Along with the interviews, archival data and annual program evaluation reports, including public service user satisfaction surveys, were also collected and analyzed to better understand each problem solving case.

Table 1 presents the ten cases and agencies, all of whom have consented to be identified. Among the ten public agencies selected, two (C3,9) are at the central government level and the remaining eight are at the municipal or county government level. Five agencies (C4,5,7,8,10) are headquartered in the capital, Taipei City, with 2.6 million residents; two (C1,2) are in the south in Kaohsiung City, with a population of 2.7 million; and C6 is in rural Pingtung County, with a population of 850,000[2]. Problems that are identified by these ten cases range from social, economic or post-crisis emergency response between year 2009 to 2014.

[2] For more information, see the Republic of China, Ministry of the Interior, Dept. of Statistics from http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/index.aspx. Retrieved April 1, 2014.

Table 1 Public Agency Problem Solving Case Briefings

Case #	Problem Identified	Level of Gov.	Public Agency	Time	Proposed Solution
C1	Stable energy needed for permanent housing in post-Morakot disaster remote neighborhood	Local gov.	KaohsiungCityMorakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council	2013	Introduce govt.-subsidized solar water heaters
C2	Farmsdestroyed by typhoon/unemployment in post-Morakot disaster neighborhood	Local gov.	KaohsiungCityMorakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council	2013	Introduce organic farm
C3	Economically disadvantaged status for indigenous women in post-Morakot disaster neighborhood	Central gov.	Gender Equality Committee, Executive Yuan	2011	Taiwan Indigent Women Style Project
C4	Insufficient safe public spaces for children	Local gov.	TaipeiCity Government, Dept. of Social Welfare, Division of Welfare Services for Women and ChildCareCenters	2009-2013	Introduce Taipei City Parent-Child Centers
C5	Lack of civic awareness and ability to reflect citizens' needs to government among Taipei residents	Local gov.	TaipeiCity Government, Dept. of Social Welfare, Division of Civic Organizations	2013	Introduce community empowerment projects
C6	High youth unemployment; insufficient farmers; ineffectiveness in agricultural produce sales	Local gov.	Pingtung CountyGovernment, Labor Affairs Department	2013-2014	Introduce Swallow Fly South Project
C7	Youth problems, especially among underprivileged youth	Local gov.	TaipeiCity Government, Dept. of Social Welfare, Division of Welfare Service for Children and Youth	2003-2013	Introduce Youth Service Centers
C8	No comprehensive approach for individuals with psychiatric problem rehabilitation	Local gov.	TaipeiCity Government, Dept. of Social Welfare, Division of Welfare Services for the Disabled	2013	Introduce clubhouse model for psychosocial rehabilitation services
C9	Unemployment among psychiatric disabled	Central gov.	Ministry of Labor, Workforce Development Agency, Taoyuan-Hsinchu- Miaoli Branch	2013	Empower private companies to establish social enterprise divisions
C10	Lack of desire and convenience for senior citizens to spend time outdoors	Local gov.	TaipeiCity Government, Dept. of Social Welfare, Division of Welfare Services for Senior Citizens	2013	Introduce more than 700 senior-friendly stations

Source: compiled by author.

IV. Case Analysis

Based on the empirical data that were provided first-hand by interviewees from these public agencies, two distinct analytical stages in the problem solving approach to value production were identified: (1) the problem / solution nomination stage and (2) the solution implementation stage.

1. Problem / Solution Nomination Stage

In this study, the problem/solution nomination stage specifically refers to the initial identification of the problem and the proposal of solutions (Kingdon, 1984; Nelson, 1984; Peters, 2005). As soon as a problem is identified, a certain value has already been attached because of the problematization process (Meyer, 1995; Bacchi, 2012).

When public phenomenon X is not taken for granted, it is considered "problematic" or deemed in need of fixing and requires efforts to change the status quo; this involves objective or subjective judgments and the attachment of value, including economic, ecological, political, social, or cultural value (Lapsley and Pong, 2000; Greenhalgh, 2008; Webb, 2014).

The same logic applies to the proposed solutions. Moreover, according to the interviewees' testimony, both the problem and solution nomination processes involve actors from the public, private, and volunteer sectors at different levels, along with the input of citizens, e.g., through polling regarding the mayor's or local government's overall performance or a specific policy. Various actors' respective preferences and needs embedded in the legal and resource structure all influence the problematization and solution proposal process. Table 2 shows the method by which the problem was identified - either top-down, bottom-up, side in; why such problem was identified, what

Table 2 Problem Identification and Solution Proposal

Case	How Problem / Solution Are Identified	Why	Driver*	Who	What	
	Top-down/ Bottom-Up	Why this particular problem?	What drives collaboration?	Whose Value	Type of Value Represented	Nature of Value
C1	Top-down	Order from central govt. Residents' urgent need for electricity	a+b+c	Govt clean energy campaign	Ecological value	Intended Positive
C2	Top-down	Sudden unemployment due to natural disaster/immediate threat to life	b+c	Central govt Private sector/NGO	Ecological value Economic value Social value	Intended Positive
C3	Top-down/ Side in: APEC/ International trend	Long-term unemployment among indigenous women	a+c	APEC Central govt Indigenous women	Economic value Social value	Intended Positive
C4	Top-down/Mayor's White Book Survey	Mayor's response to public survey	a+c+d	Child-parent	Social value	Intended Positive
C5	Bottom-up From frontline staff	Deepen democracy/teach citizens to disclose their needs to govt/make policy closer to citizens' needs	c	Govt NGO	Political value	Intended Positive
C6	Top-down from mayor	Youth unemployment rate is high in all cities; aging farmers, abandoned farm land	a+c+d	Govt NGO	Economic value Social value	Intended Positive
C7	Side in: International experience influence/ Hong Kong	Youth problem in old district/lack of youth center in Taipei	c+d	Govt and NGO	Social value	Intended Positive
C8	Side in:Advocacy from NGO coalition/1990 clubhouse model from American professor / Hong Kong	NGO advocacy through disabled committee	a+c+d	Govt and NGO	Social value	Intended Positive
C9	Bottom-up / Top-down / Ministry of Labor / Ministry of Economic / social enterprise	Long-term unemployment problem	a+c+d	Govt and private sector	Social value	Intended Positive
C10	Top-down, high level manager has interest in social enterprise	Encourage elderly people to go out	a+c	Govt and private sector	Social value	Intended Positive

Note: * a: leadership; b: consequential incentives; c: interdependence; d: uncertainty (Emerson et al., 2012: 9).

Source: compiled by author.

drives the cross-sector collaboration - leadership, consequential incentive, interdependence or uncertainty (Emerson et al., 2012: 9); whose value is represented; and what type and nature of the value, etc.

In six cases (C1-C4; C6 and C10), the problem identification and solution proposal was top down, whereas in cases C5 and C8, both the problem and the solution were driven from the bottom up[3]. Furthermore, aside from having a top-down or bottom-up driving force, C3, C7 and C8 were also subject to "side-in" forces, which refers to influence from outside the domestic government structure, such as C3 was inspired by international influence in APEC and C8 was promoted by restless advocacy effort from NGO coalition and American clubhouse model since 1990s..In case C1, the problem of how to introduce green energy in a community affected by Typhoon Morakot and the proposed adoption of solar water heaters was derived from the central government, namely the Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council, Executive Yuan[4]. An officer from Kaohsiung City Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council recalled,

> The solar water heater program was passed down to me from the central government's post-disaster reconstruction unit when I was newly transferred from Pingtung County to the Kaohsiung County government office in 2010. The central government simply told me that there would be a financial subsidy package from the Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs that the local government could apply. Then, it would be up to the local government to implement this clean energy program and look for the remaining funding or raise money from donations. When I received this assignment, the concept of renewable energy in the form of solar

[3] The baseline for defining a top-down or bottom-up process is the position of senior civil servants. If the problem and solution are identified and proposed by senior civil servants or below, then it is referred to as a bottom-up process; if they are proposed by a higher-ranking official or higher-level office, then it is top-down.

[4] Executive Yuan in Republic of China is the government institution headed by the Prime Minister to plan and implement different public policies.

> water heater systems was completely foreign to me, and there were more than ninety households waiting desperately to have warm water generation systems installed in their newly built permanent housing in remote neighborhoods… I started to make several phone calls with references from the central government and their non-governmental collaborators at National Cheng Kung University and the Solar Thermal Energy Association… (Face-to-face interview on October 17, 2013).

The public value created in this particular problem / solution nomination stage was an ecological value that was passed down from the central government's overall clean energy initiative. Therefore, the central government attempted to impose its value on the local government and the neighborhood(s) in question. The nature of this clean energy value was objective or universal; global warming has long been identified as a collective problem for the earth, and sustainable energy development has become a trend that is internationally welcomed. The value was voluntarily imposed by the central government and accepted by the local government.

The contrasting cases C1 and C8 illustrate the bottom-up mode of problem identification and solution proposal from the producer side of public value creation. The third sector, the Eden Social Welfare Foundation, which has advocated clubhouse operation as a better method for the rehabilitation of people with psychiatric problems since 2003, finally and successfully convinced the Taipei City government that its current handling and medical treatment of individuals with psychiatric disabilities must be changed. An interviewee at Eden Social Welfare Foundation described,

> The beginning of the public sector's consideration of this new way of providing psychiatric rehabilitation services started from an ad hoc advocacy effort consolidated by my foundation and other non-governmental organizations. After our six to seven years of

> private implementation of the clubhouse model, which differs from the conventional medical system, our positive experience encouraged us to expand the service… So, in 2009, we had an opportunity to attend an international conference where Deputy Director Huang from the Department of Social Welfare was present and welcomed our further proposals. Then, we began to voice our recommendations to the local government through four consecutive meetings held by the Taipei City Psychiatric Disabled Protection Committee in the year 2009 (phone interview on November 22, 2013).

Eden's history and priorities as a non-governmental organization (NGO) bring an alternative social value into play. Eden's leadership feels that the organization can be useful for greater society if public agencies can participate in its mission through public value co-creation. For this reason, Eden repeatedly asserted its value and methods to the municipal government through the Taipei City Psychiatric Disabled Protection Committee. Its clubhouse model helps individuals with psychiatric illness transform themselves from passive patients who need help into proactive beings who can offer help to others and become assets rather than burdens to society. The nature of this public value is thus subjective and involuntary because the clubhouse model is an innovation imported from the US and Hong Kong that requires a change in learning and perceptions on the part of the Taipei City government managerial team.

In comparing C1, C8, and other cases, it is notable that the "producer" of public value in the problem identification and solution proposal stage does not seem to be limited to public agencies as they have conventionally been defined in public service delivery, in which the public agency is the producer and the citizen is the user. Particularly from a public-private collaborative problem solving perspective, depending on the circumstances, the creation of public value might encompass public managers at all levels as value producers, from

high-level officials to frontline civil servants and co-producers, including actors from private-sector entities, third-sector citizens, or even international actors. Any of these actors can identify a problem, propose a solution, and produce or co-produce public value. All value generated at this stage is mostly considered intentional and positive, as indicated in Table 2.

Lastly, in this problem / solution nomination stage, if we make analysis from the perspective of collaborative governance, the ten empirical cases show trends that concur with proposition one where Emerson et al. (2012: 10) hypothesize: "one or more of the drivers of leadership, consequential incentives, interdependence, or uncertainty are necessary for a Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR) to begin. The more drivers present and recognized by participants, the more likely a CGR will be initiated". Asides from C5 which was initiated by single driver, the other nine cases were initiated by two or more drivers. Yet what is more interesting is that all ten cases are motivated by driver c which refers to "interdependence" between various sectors including either "sector failure" (Bryson et al., 2006) or "constraints on participation" (Ansell and Gash, 2008). In other words, "interdependence" is the most pivotal driver among others to initiate successful collaboration.

2. Solution Implementation Stage

The second stage of the public value creation process is labeled the "solution implementation stage." This stage refers to the solution implementation process (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hjern and Hull, 1982), during which the proposed solution is either accepted or rejected by the users of public goods and services. Table 3 delineates the "who," "what," "when," and "where" aspects of the solution implementation process. Among the ten cases, no cases were solved by government along. Four cases (C3, C6, C9 and C10) required collaboration with nonprofits. Another four cases (C4, C5, C7 and C8) involved collaboration with for-profit entities, and C1 and C2 involved all three sectors and citizens in the implementation procedure. These

ten cases concur with what Alford (2013) and Verschuere et al. (2012) argue about how co-production between the government and non-governmental entities as a mean to solve public problems.

Table 3 Solution Implementation Process

Case	Who	What					When	Where
	Which Sector*	Type of P**	Solution Type***	Expectation	Outcome 1st/2nd/3rd-order effects	Congruence	One-shot/ Continuous	Scope of Problem Solving
C1	5	II	2	Unlikely to accomplish	Beyond expectations Unintended results 2nd order effect	No	One shot	Typhoon affected community
C2	5	III	2	A hopeful innovation to integrate life, production, and ecology	Residents complained /lack communication/ implementation problems, unstable leadership 1st order effect	No	One Shot	Typhoon affected community
C3	2	III	2	Create a “yuan” shop platform for indigenous women’s products	Developed as planned, only minor challenge in talent matching to start a new social enterprise 1st order effect	Yes, beyond expectations	Continuous	Taiwan island wide, indigenous women
C4	3	II	2	Provide safe child-parent space	Difficult to find locations, need to adjust methods 3rd order effect	Yes, beyond expectations	Continuous	Family w/ children under 6 in Taipei
C5	3	III	2	Provide systematic and organizational levels and long-term empowerment	Save public money and manpower to achieve the intended goal Role of govt changes as partner or networker 1st order effect	Yes, beyond expectations/ Snowball effect	4 years	Communities in Taipei: divided into 4 grades
C6	2	III	2	Attract young workers back to work on farm, upgrade farming industry in Pingtung	Good cooperation with small local farmers, efforts from youth 2nd order effect	Maybe (not yet accomplished)	One shot project	Pingtung youth aged 19-24 Pingtung residents
C7	3	III	2	Open several youth centers	Snowball/enterprises donation/NGOs enter policy making/rapid growth of NGO/spillover effect to central govt 1st order effect	Yes, beyond expectations	Continuous	Underprivileged youth aged 12-18

Case	Who	What					When	Where
	Which Sector*	Type of P**	Solution Type***	Expectation	Outcome 1st/2nd/3rd-order effects	Congruence	One-shot/ Continuous	Scope of Problem Solving
C8	3	III	2	Goal – serve 120 disabled friends/2 yrs Change the motivation/ confidence of the disabled	Media exposure Snowball effect/some challenges btw govt and legal status need to be adjusted/Civic agency in policy making 2nd order effect	Yes, beyond expectations	One shot/ experiment for now (only 1 year run)	Nearly 120,000 disabled citizens in Taipei
C9	2	III	2	Create more jobs for the disabled/ Help large enterprises become affiliated with social enterprise	Snowball effect Learn on the job/recruit more management staff Change in role of govt as a companion to enterprises 2nd order effect	Yes, beyond expectations	Continuous	Disabled/Private enterprises
C10	2	III	2	Create a more friendly environment and more care for the elderly	Snowball effect/ more enterprises want to join Spillover to NGO cooperation 3rd order effect	Yes, beyond expectations	Continuous	360,000 elderly in Taiwan's fastest aging city

Note: *0 = 1st sector; 1 = 1st sector+ citizen; 2 = 1st +2nd sector+ citizen; 3= 1st + 3rd sector + citizen; 4 = 1st+2nd +3rd sector; 5= 1st+2nd+3rd sector+citizen

** See Table 4 for more info on type of problem.

*** Type of Solution/Innovation 1=Renewed process and service: service delivery; 2=New form of org: org design/ppp; 3 = New management and implementation tool, e.g., ICT, digitalization, E-gov.

Source: compiled by author.

In terms of the types of problem being posed, most of the cases address adaptive problems defined by Type III (See Table 4 below) rather than technical problems, which are mechanical and have clearly defined problems and solutions. For example, in case C7, the problem was how to mitigate challenges for youth from unprivileged families. This problem was not clearly defined because youth problems are multifaceted and require learning on the part of both the producers and users of public services. The solution to this problem is more complex than what can be provided by a single prescription. The proposed solution to build youth centers through collaboration between the Taipei City government and an NGO was only one attempt to mitigate this

adaptive problem. Once a center is open, the youth and/or their families must use the center's resources for their benefit, i.e., it is up to the users of public services to send a message of confirmation or rejection to the public agency regarding whether or not this solution solves the particular adaptive problem. Government can potentially learn from the users of public services and innovate responsibly.

Table 4 Situation Type

Situation	Problem Definition	Solution and Implementation	Primary Locus of Responsibility	Type of Work
Type I	Clear	Clear	Producer of Public Service	Technical
Type II	Clear	Requires learning	Producer and User of Public Service	Technical and adaptive
Type III	Requires learning	Requires learning	User>Producer	Adaptive

Source: A modified version from Table 1: Situational Types in Heifetz (1994: 76).

Regarding the type of solution implemented, this paper borrows the categorization used by the European Union to assess public sector innovation[5]. Three types of public sector innovations are introduced: (1) renewed processes and services, (2) new forms of organization, and (3) new management and implementation tools. All ten cases in this study adopted new forms of organization as the solution to the posed adaptive problem, mostly involving public and private cooperation (Osborne, 2000). Those cases also mirror what Osborne (2010) pointed out the importance of external parties in providing public services.

The Pingtung County Government's Labor Affairs Department (case C6) worked closely with award-winning local farmers and farm cooperatives to launch the Swallow Fly South Project, which aimed to develop a "root economy" for this agriculturally based and aging county. Public and private

[5] 2012. *Trends and Challenges in Public Sector Innovation in Europe*. from http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/public-sector-innovation/index_en.htm. Retrieved April 2, 2014.

organizations joined efforts to attract young people between the ages of 18 and 24 back to their home county to balance work, family, and natural life.

> In most cities and counties in Taiwan, the unemployment rate is highest for individuals between the age of 19 and 24 years old. Our Mayor came up with this idea of developing a 'root economy.' The local social enterprise or private sector is not yet willing to move in this direction. We, as government, like to go ahead and pave the way for new directions. We hope young people can return to their hometown, not to be conventional farmers like their grandparents but to become agricultural managers. The fact that our young people are leaving their hometowns for job opportunities is not good…it is something 'rootless.'
>
> Pingtung County has rich agricultural resources, and we wish to redefine what the agricultural industry is for a younger generation. Young people with knowledge about information technology can bring agriculture to the level of the 'cloud.' Our award-winning farmers can teach young people farming techniques. This should be the new social value and responsibility of Pingtung… to solve the problem of abandoned farm land and rising youth unemployment. (Face-to-face interview with senior civil servants on December 16, 2013)

What is more is that the ten cases exhibit different degree of effect produced by cross-sector collaboration as argued by Innes and Booher (1999). Four out of the ten cases generate 1st order effect such as C2 creates innovative strategies in solving unemployment program after sudden natural crisis while integrating life, production and ecology and C7 accumulates social capital by creating underprivileged youth a second home to stay after school. More transformative effect - 3rd order effect are also found in two of the cases - namely C4 and C10. Whereas in the former case we find sign of co-evolution

and adaptation of child care service to include also elder service in the same child-parent center, the latter case also shows adaptation of service for elderly into other social welfare domain such as the disable. In both cases, new norms for addressing social problems are created and those new effects are not in the original intended collaboration planning or "deliberate" planning (Mintzberg et al., 1998) or "planning from goals" (McCaskey, 1974) but are emerging in the process of implementing solution. This is what MCaskey (1974) calls "planning from thrust". What is more is that these 3rd order of effect also resembles ongoing learning that are found in successful collaborations (Leach et al., 2014; Chen, 2010). In both C4 and C10, the longer the solution to social problem is implemented by cross-sector collaboration, the more knowledge flow is observed between public and private participants and the more time partners can have to regroup and reframe problems at stakes collectively.

Among the ten cases, the original expectations and outcomes of the solution implementation do not always exhibit congruent patterns. For example, case C2 produced an unexpected negative outcome, whereas the other cases mostly produced positive outcomes that exceeded the initial expectations, with the occasional snowball or spillover effect. When Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan in 2009, it caused the worst flooding in fifty years. Serious landslides destroyed the homes and farmland of native residents who were mostly members of an underprivileged indigenous minority. The Kaohsiung City Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council, the agency in C2, had to address an exacerbated long-term unemployment problem in typhoon-affected neighborhoods. The solution that was implemented was passed down from the central government as a result of its cooperation with the largest private corporation in Taiwan, Foxconn Technology — manufacturers of the iPhone. Under a build-own-profit-transfer (BOPT) mode of operation, the Sanling Organic Farm was founded with the aim of providing improved job opportunities, living standards, production methods, and ecology to the typhoon-affected communities. Although the plan sounded optimistic

and unproblematic, many challenges arose during the implementation process, including disputes over farmland with the original tenants, who were also organic farmers. In the name of the "public interest" and under orders from the central government, the original tenants were forced to terminate their land leases with the Taisugar Company. The local residents also complained about the lack of communication between the Sanling Farm operating team and its neighbors. Problems included unpleasant odors from the farm, unstable leadership, and the impact of job creation for people in urgent need.

Case C7, in contrast, illustrates a case in which the positive outcome far exceeded the initial expectations. The original idea of establishing a center for underprivileged youth in Taipei City was rife with challenges, especially in terms of location and space retrieval. However, after minor adjustments in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, the public agency has been able to successfully launch six youth centers since 1996. According to the interviewees (phone interviews on November 11, 2013), these third-sector organizations learned from and were empowered by accumulated positive experiences yielded by cooperation with the first sector. Some organizations became resourceful and extended their services to work with the central government. Social enterprises and private companies also appreciated the services provided and the social value created for the youth, and many have voluntarily participated by donating goods for the youth centers. Through regular meetings and several communication channels, contracted service providers, namely NGOs, can engineer their demands and needs to affect the official policy making process.

What is the public value that is produced and reproduced in this second stage- the solution implementation stage? Is it the same as the value produced in the first value creation stage? Table 5 presents a comparison between the value produced and the value reproduced. The most interesting finding from this cross-analysis is that the reproduced value encompasses more diverse value types than the value created in the original construct; unintended value is

further created in the second solution implementation process via snowball or spillover effects. Value creation is a continuous process whereby value is recursively produced even in the second stage — the solution implementation process.

Table 5 Comparing Value Produced and Reproduced

Case#	Producer's Values Produced in Problem/Solution Nomination Stage	Whose Value	Nature of Value	Value Produced and Reproduced in Solution Implementation Stage	Nature of Value	Scope of Value Outward/Upward/ downward
C1	Ecological value	Govt clean energy campaign	Intended Positive	Ecological value Value production snowball effect Economic value Political value (civic participation/voting) Social value: help others, togetherness/ intergovernmental, cross-boundary, among citizens	Intended/ Unintended Positive	Outward – spread to 2nd phase of Shao-Lin village (different staff/office in charge) Upward – becomes a successful precedent to copy later by leader Downward – private sector/NGO/citizen
C2	Ecological value Economic value Social value	Central govt. Private sector/NGO	Intended Positive	Ecological value	Intended Unintended Negative	Downward – residents do not share the same value; instead, their original positive value was destroyed
C3	Economic value Social value	APEC Central govt Indigenous women	Intended Positive	Economic value: family economic, native economic, small economic, community based economy Social value: togetherness, women create economic value and bond with family, family value, value of offering "hope" to indigenous women Political value: APEC includes women's issues	Intended Positive	Outward within agency, Downward to community, designers
C4	Social value	Child-Parent	Intended Positive	Social value: NGO increases focus on professional child-parent training/Community development Cultivate closer child-parent relationships	Intended/ Unintended Positive	Upward: central govt later subsidies child care resource center Outwardward: interagency cooperation among staff Downward: provide service to community

Case#	Producer's Values Produced in Problem/Solution Nomination Stage	Whose Value	Nature of Value	Value Produced and Reproduced in Solution Implementation Stage	Nature of Value	Scope of Value Outward/Upward/ downward
C5	Political value	Govt NGO	Intended Positive	Political value Social value: closer community bond/neighbor relations	Intended Positive	Upward: central govt launches similar effort Outward: interagency staff Downward: community org, private sector
C6	Economic value Social value	Govt NGO	Intended Positive	Economic value Social value Ecological value	Intended/ unintended Positive	upward: creation of Agriculture University as new institution Outward (maybe) Downward: more farmers, private sector, community, citizen
C7	Social value	Govt and NGO	Intended Positive	Social added value (a home for young people, place to discuss problems, preventive measure for juvenile problems)	Intended Positive	Not yet upward Outward (maybe) Downward (NGO, parents, children)
C8	Social value	Govt and NGO	Intended Positive	Social value added (public can view the disabled differently; change in identity and improvement in confidence)	Intended Positive	Not yet upward Outward yes (staff understand this clubhouse model better as an alternative) Downward (other NGOs and even private sector)
C9	Social value	Govt and private sector	Intended Positive	Social added value (increased social responsibility) Added market economic value (increase the employment of the disabled in companies, create jobs)	Intended Positive	Downward (to more enterprises and social enterprises)
C10	Social value	Govt and Private Sector	Intended Positive	Social added value (children respect the elderly, the elderly are for cared by society, increase trust/love in society; enterprise pays tribute to their social role) Added market economic value (elderly go out to shop)	Intended/ Unintended Positive	Upward (not sure) Down or Outward (other public agencies/enterprise/ NGO/citizen)

Source: compiled by author.

Case C1 is an example of the above findings. In this case, the ecological value of promoting solar energy in post-disaster reconstruction zones was passed top-down from the central government to the local Kaohsiung City government at the initial problem identification and solution proposal stages. When analyzing the solution implementation stage, this study found that ecological, economic, political, and social values were created during implementation. The front-line public managers were forced to learn on the job in the manner of adaptive leaders facing adaptive problems (Heifetz, 1994). They explored the options available to them and solved problems by making phone calls and contacting various public and private organizations such as the Jiasian District office (seeking additional financial support), the Solar Thermal Energy Association (organizing solar information sessions with eight different solar energy companies), the Energy Research Team at National Cheng Kung University (voluntarily sharing resources and references), and the Shiao-Lin Village Community Development Organization (which volunteered to act as an information clearinghouse for residents). Eventually, many previously unidentified organizations and private enterprises voluntarily participated in this project and helped the public agency to solve this disaster-induced problem.

The solution implementation process in C1 further generated the unintended social value of "togetherness to help the disaster-affected area" at the intergovernmental level, between business communities, or among citizens. Through installation of solar heaters in the village hit by the typhoon, social capital (Putnam, 1993) was created as a by-product of solving disaster-induced problems to further bond the local civic community. Political value, or what Fung and Wright (2001) describe as citizens' capacity for deliberation and collective action, was also created beyond the plan's original intention. This phenomenon was also a result of a value spillover effect or a by-product of solving a social problem. Residents were gathered by the village authority to a solar water heater information session and public hearing to

decide collectively whether they wished to use solar energy in their permanent housing complex. During this process, ninety households of residents learned to listen to others, whether a technical expert's opinion or their neighbor's thoughts, and they voted to decide on a course of action as a collective. This energy solving case created a space to cultivate civic engagement and yielded unintended additional political value. Aside from the additional type of value created, the scope of value is observed to be widen in the solution implementation stage. In case C1, this innovative project was so successful and had such high user satisfaction that the second phase of Shiao-Lin Village mimicked the same solar water heater implementation as a solution to a lack of energy in this disaster-affected community. This time, a different public management team was in charge of the second-phase reconstruction effort, and this team was willing to consult the staff in charge of C1 when implementing the project. The central government considered a similar mode of operation for other projects. The value created by C1 has spread downward and upward. In other words, public value is not only produced but rather maintains a reproductive life of its own.

Lastly, as we examine scope of value expanding either downward, upward or outward, the ten cases inform us the potential of collaborative governance for adaptation and feedback mechanism we find in resilient, decentralized systems (Holling, 1978). Among the ten cases, cases that spread the wider the scope of value, the more sustainable the collaboration might be. In other words, those cases that generate wider scope of value means that they are more responsive to the impacts they created and produce more "returns" for partners to justify their continued involvement to their collaboration. It also shows that some values that were produced and reproduced in solution implementation stage are not only intentional but unintentional. This finding is contrary to what Emerson et al. (2012: 18) proposed in their proposition nine: "The impacts resulting from collaborative action are likely to be closer to the targeted outcomes with fewer unintended negative consequences when they

are specified and derived from a shared theory of action during collaborative dynamics." Only one of ten cases exhibit negative unintended value whereas there are at least three cases - C1, C4, C6 generate unintended positive effect and extra types of public value which were not in the original deliberative planning. For example, C1 was designed to generate only ecological value yet the co-production process at the end generates extra economic value as solar energy equipment becomes popular in market and especially among disaster prone area. Other than that, political and social value are also co-produced and reproduced as residents learn to participate in community public policy making and cross-boundary collaboration among business, university and public sector is also encouraged to collectively solve public problems.

V. Theory Building based on Empirical Analyses

Deriving from the above empirical observation and analyses, this research proposes to borrow the structuration logic from Giddens (Layder, 1998) to expand our conceptual understanding of public value by explaining how it is an end which does not exist normatively and independently apart from individual activity (Radnor et al., 2013). Instead, public value only exists insofar as it is continually *produced* and *reproduced* through the duality of a structure embedded in the entire problem solving process, shown by Taiwan case studies, where intended value strategically crafted by public managers feeds forward from the problem/solution nomination or value definition stage to the solution implementation or value delivery stage, and the intended values accompanied by the unintended values are fed back to the former stage. Figure 2 depicts this feedforward and feedback circular loop in the structuration model.



Figure 2 Public value structuration cycle

Source: Compiled by author.

As a summary of the above empirical case discussion, how public value as a normative end is recursively created is depicted in below Figure 3. This public value creation mapping is based on the structuration cycle combined with an emphasis on the contribution of cross-sector coproduction of public value outcome. It delineates how public value is initially *produced* by public managers and *co-produced* by non-governmental actors at the problem/ solution nomination stage; it is subsequently *co-produced* again at the solution implementation stage along with non-governmental actors from the private or third sector as public-service joint providers; and it is then *reproduced* when users of public services convey their satisfaction with the public services provided. To complete the cycle, the reproduced public value feeds back to the social outcome and the result is reflected in the future social problem. In this cycle, public value is a dynamic end and it is produced, co-produced and reproduced in an ongoing manner. As a result, the pragmatist urges reflection regarding the nature of public value not as a measurable *outcome* but as a *process* during which public value is recursively generated.



Figure 3 Public Value Production Mapping in Cross-Sector Collaboration

Source: compiled by author.

Based on the pragmatist approach of public value creation and the structuration theory in the above discussion, a public value constellation (shown in Figure 4) can be drawn to illustrate additional perspectives on public value that were not emphasized in Moore's public value discussion. This paper argues that these additional aspects of public value should be taken into consideration and made subject to empirical examination in later studies to better understand the gap between normative and pragmatic approaches of public value creation and how that gap affects how we value government output.



Figure 4 Public value constellation

Source: compiled by author.

As shown in Figure 4, this spectrum reminds us of the tension between *what the public values most* and *what adds value to the public sphere* (Benington, 2009). It also illustrates the contrast between *absolute value* in a *one-best-way* approach versus *relative value* in a *multiple ways* approach. Whereas public managers keep public value in mind as an *end* to create *intended value* when designing various government programs, by using different *means* during the program implementation period, both *intended* and *unintended* value might be *co-produced and reproduced*.

VI. Discussion of Findings

This paper calls for a reorientation of understanding the value of public authority. Instead of a normative perspective, the study urges a pragmatic problem solving approach to investigate how public value is created or destroyed throughout different stages of policy processes, especially under

collaborative governance setting. Summarizing what was learned from the interviewees and the cross-analysis of ten case studies in a non-US setting (Taiwan), the study finds that Giddens's (1979, 1984) structuration theory might be a useful scholarly lens — in theory — to initially unravel the blackbox of the value production process and then redefine the role of the public sector. The system of interaction among agents and the structure in the two problem solving stages — the problem/solution nomination and solution implementation processes — resemble the duality of structure advocated by Giddens to describe the creation and reproduction of social structures by agents in an ongoing manner. Other than structuration theory, by systematically analyzing ten public-private collaboration cases, this study also advances our empirical knowledge in terms of drivers, dynamics and outcome of collaborative governance. Four theoretical contributions derived from this research can be considered. The first unravels the blackbox of value production though policy processes and cross-sector perspectives. From the perspective of value production in policy process stages, the study demonstrates how value is most diversified in the solution implementation stage, where additional unintended value is introduced during policy execution. This finding echoes what Majone and Wildavsky (1978) called "implementation as evolution." The core argument is that implementation is an evolutionary process in which programs are constantly reshaped and redefined. Though intended value may be defined at the beginning by central policy makers and other co-producers, these values will almost inevitably be changed in the course of their implementation through snowballing, spillover, or by-product effects, as illustrated by the Taiwan case study. In other words, the study implies that incremental value change and organizational learning occur most notably in the course of policy implementation stage, where the role of senior civil servants is pivotal (see Figure 5). One must be sufficiently open-minded to welcome alternative value and allow the internalization of that alternative value into the existing organizational culture.



Figure 5 Role of high level manager vs senior civil servant

Source: compiled by author.

From the perspective of value production through cross-sector collaboration, the research reveals a multi-actor dynamic value production cycle (Figure 2). Within this cycle, the concept of value stretches from "what added public value" as mostly predetermined by a single public sector to "what does the public most value" (see Figure 3) involving both a negotiation process between government and non-governmental actors as public service providers and an experimental process to test which solution works better for the public service users. With the input of cross-sector collaboration, the solution to social problems is transformed from a one-best-way approach emphasizing absolute value to multiple solutions with relative value. It shows that the value of this type of collaborative governmental work relies on process rather than outcome. This pragmatic and process-oriented approach of understanding public value also reflects the spirit of a democratic institution

that sets itself apart from authoritarian regimes. Although the end results and outcomes of governance might be similar for a democratic and a non-democratic government (an authoritarian institution might be even more efficient in offering public service), the former allows a broader participation from the society in decision making and value production. In other words, this type of cross-sector value production model is representative of a participatory democratic regime such as the empirical case of this study — Taiwan, a nascent democracy — rather than an elitist type (Pulzl and Treib, 2006: 94).

Second, the pragmatist approach of studying the value of public service encourages us to redefine the role of the public sector. The role of the public sector is no longer as the sole public service provider or sole value producer. In the face of worldwide public budget deficit challenges, or even avoiding government bankruptcy[6] increasingly becoming a top priority for the public sector, the role of government is more like that of a "societal entrepreneur" (Berglund et al., 2012), sponsors or champions with a "collaborative mind-set" (Crosby and Bryson, 2010) discerning alternative solutions, utilizing every available resource from multiple venues in the society and exploiting opportunities offered by cross-sector collaboration to solve complex social problems. A public manager in this entrepreneurial context resembles Alford and Hughes's (2008: 134) pragmatism definition of public manager as one who does not define public value on behalf of society as much as he or she puts forward value propositions for consideration by the citizenry and their various political representatives.

Third, the study confirms what was proposed by collaborative governance regime theory that the more drivers present and recognized by participants, the more likely a collaboration will be initiated (Emerson et al., 2012). In specific, the ten empirical cases inform us that interdependence

[6] 2014. *Which American municipalities have filed for bankruptcy?* PBS Newshour: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/municipalities-declared-bankruptcy/. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2015.
2015. *Eurozone faces first regional bankruptcy as debt debacle stalks Austria's Carinthia*. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11447805/Eurozone-faces-first-regional-bankruptcy-as-debt-debacle-stalks-Austrias-Carinthia.html. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2015.

between various sectors might be the most pivotal driver among the others that cannot be missing to successfully initiate cross-sector partnership.

Lastly, data analysis shows us that not only deliberate planning in a mandated collaboration can generate positive outcome in collaborative governance. Sometimes, contrary to the argument of McMaskey (1974), "planning from thrust" can also occur in a "loosely" mandated or even experimental collaboration and they can very well generate constructive output or even 3rd order transformative effect (Innes and Booher, 1999) that was beyond the expectation of original planning. What is more interesting is that this type of unintended positive outcome from the emerging process might be the proof that cross-sector collaboration could yield alternative and adaptive solutions to wicked problems that are not anticipated before and can create adaptation (Emerson et al., 2012: 19). In other words, collaboration has potential to promote innovative thinking and doing if the collaborating partners can be resilient enough to regroup and reframe problems at stake collectively (Crosby and Bryson, 2005).

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跨部門合作過程間之公共價值產出：從台灣問題解決實案談起

簡赫琳*

摘 要

過去二十年來，公共價值這概念逐漸在公共管理學門日漸受到關注，但學界仍需要更多的實證研究來釐清此概念的應用，且至今台灣還鮮少有專注在公共價值分析的相關研究。本研究採用一個實用主義問題解決的途徑，配合著台灣十個實證個案，期望來分析公共價值在跨部門合作政策運作過程中，究竟是如何被產出的。研究者首先將政策運作過程分成兩個階段來分析：第一為問題及解決方案提名階段；第二為解決方案執行階段，隨後再用結構化分析來理解行動者及結構的互動關係。本研究最後共提出四個研究發現：第一、研究分析顯示，在解決方案執行的階段是較可以拓展公共價值的觸及面向，及產生促進價值再生的持續動能；第二、此公共價值實用主義切入點可以鼓勵公部門角色被重新定位，成為具有帶動「協作關懷」的社會創業家、支持者或前鋒者；第三、部門間的正向「互賴關係」是推動合作成功與否的重要動力；最後、個案分析顯示跨部門夥伴模式是有潛力提升組織之應變能力與其韌性的。

關鍵詞：公共價值實用主義、結構化理論、跨部門合作、公私協力、問題解決

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